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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 01349-84
29 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
 Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: John Horton
 National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Latin America
 February 1984

1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 22 February 1984.

Chile

2. The holiday season in Chile was unusually active. From the leftist opposition, there were bombings, forest fires set, and attacks on police stations. There was also right-wing terrorism such as fire-bombings of churches. While the economy seems to be picking up, a peso devaluation is rumored, copper prices are low, and unemployment remains a critical issue.

3. We see prospects for a political confrontation in Chile in the next few months as better than 50/50. The National Workers Council (CNT) is planning a protest on 27 March, and a strike is being considered for April. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) could also pull off some dramatic actions. May Day is an occasion for protests and 11 May -- the anniversary of the first Day of Protest in 1983 -- could provide the focus for violent demonstrations. Moreover, there will be the June anniversary of the copper workers strike.

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4. The following developments would indicate that a serious crisis is brewing in Chile.

- Major changes in the political parties law by President Pinochet.
- The resignation of Interior Minister Jarpa.
- The use of transitory articles rather than judicial procedures to deal with opposition political or labor activities.
- Verbal or physical attacks on the church, on rights, or on political activity.
- Widespread support for a national strike, cutting across class and regional lines.
- Firing of military personnel for political remarks.

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Guatemala

6. General Humberto Mejía seems to be in a slightly stronger position, moving as he is toward elections. He has the support of the military, and there are few signs of unrest at senior and middle levels. although less is known -- as usual -- of the junior ranks.

The IMF Agreement could lapse because tax revenues are not as high as expected. This would create serious political problems for Mejia, but it looks as though he will hang on.

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7. There has been less violence on the part of the military in late 1983, but right-wing parties, with governmental personnel involved, did indulge in violence--probably beyond Mejia's control. In an unusual practice, the government has published lists of those they have detained and has even released some of them. With the election campaign coming on, an increase in violence can be expected.

8. The election is scheduled for 1 July, and how it will be perceived will be much affected by the level of violence. The elections for the constituent assembly will probably be honest, with the better organized right-wing parties--Sandoval's Movement of National Liberation (MLN) particularly--being victorious. The more centrist parties are still disorganized and those more to the left are losing their momentum. Voting will be lighter in the western highlands, where the Indians are, and heavier in Guatemala City and in the eastern provinces.

9. Guerrilla activity continues its cyclic pattern. There were ambushes of government forces by the insurgents in December and January, but they seemed to run down about the third week in January. The Government dispatched forces to Petén which put the guerrillas there in disarray


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The Guerrilla Army of the People (EGP) is factionalized and the Communist Party (PGT) is split again. They are not likely to constitute a major threat to the government over the next six months.

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El Salvador

13. The statement of Guillermo Ungo that the FDR/FMLN would not oppose the elections is essentially meaningless. We expect the guerrillas to keep up their military activity. There probably will be some harrassment of voters and polling places on election day, but this will be incidental to their broader military campaign. An attack on a departmental capital in eastern El Salvador just before the election is a major concern.

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14. Attached are coordinated Intelligence Community estimates of government and insurgent force strengths in Central America and Cuba. Please note that subsequent to our session on 22 February, the total for the Salvadoran Army was increased to 27,300 (bringing the total active duty force level up to 40,000). A number of adjustments were made to the Cuban figures resulting in a total active duty force estimate of 280,000. The figures for total active duty military and security personnel (as well as the number of Salvadoran armed insurgents) are UNCLASSIFIED

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15. For your information, due to a National Intelligence Council Conference the week of 19 March, the next Warning Meeting will be held on Wednesday, 28 March.

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Attachments:

- A. Government and Insurgent Forces in Central America
February 1984

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GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
February 1984

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES</u>	<u>ARMED INSURGENTS</u>	
Guatemala	43,000		25X1
Honduras	22,000	*	
El Salvador	40,000	9,000 - 11,000	
Nicaragua	49,000		25X1
Costa Rica	8,000	*	
Cuba	280,000		

* No active insurgency, but several hundred radical leftists probably are armed.

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MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA
February, 1984

GUATEMALA**Active Duty Personnel**

Army	26,900
Air Force	750
Navy and Marines	980
Mobile Military Police	3,000
National Police	9,500
Treasury Police	1,900
Total	43,030

Others

Army Reserve	10,000
Air Force Reserve	200
Civilian Defense Forces	500,000*

*Less than 5 percent have small arms.

HONDURAS**Active Duty Personnel**

Army	14,600
Air Force	1,300
Navy and Marines	850
Public Security Forces	5,000
Total	21,750

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EL SALVADOR**Active Duty Personnel**

Army	27,300
Air Force	500
Navy	500
Treasury Police	1,800
National Police	5,500
National Guard	<u>4,200</u>
Total	39,800

Others

Civil Defense Forces	(a few thousand)
Territorial Service	(60,000 to 100,000 inactive reservists)

NICARAGUA**Active Duty Personnel**

Ground Forces (Army and Ministry of Interior)	19,500 - 20,000
Reserves	12,000 - 16,000
Militia	5,000 - 10,000
Air and air defense forces	1,750
Navy	500
Police	<u>5,000</u>
Total	43,750 - 53,250

Others

Unmobilized Reserves (armed)	10,000 - 12,000
Organized Militia (unarmed)	9,000 - 11,000
Other Militia	30,000 - 40,000

COSTA RICA**Active Duty Personnel**

Civil Guards	4,800
Rural Guards	<u>3,200</u>
Total	8,000

CUBA**Active Duty Personnel**

Army (regulars)	110,000 - 120,000
Army (ready reserve)	110,000 - 135,000
Air Force and air defense forces	18,500
Navy	12,500
MININT	2,500 - 3,000
Police	12,000
Total	265,500 - 301,000

Others

Militia	600,000
Youth Labor Army	100,000
Civil Defense	50,000 - 100,000
Border Guards	3,500
Police Auxiliary	52,000

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